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Inseparable, but Not Equal 
Assessing U.S.–EU Relations in the Wake of the NSA Surveillance Affair 
Johannes Thimm 
The revelations about the data collection and espionage activities of the National Secu-
rity Agency (NSA) have left their mark on transatlantic relations. In the beginning of 
2013, the future of relations between the United States and the European Union looked 
bright, fueled by optimism about the negotiation of a transatlantic free trade area. Since 
then, tensions have risen over leaked information about the NSA’s actions. The dispute 
is significant beyond the immediate issue of surveillance because it draws attention 
to the enduring asymmetries in the transatlantic relationship. Discussions about its 
decline notwithstanding, the U.S. upholds its claim to global leadership and continues 
to rely on controversial security measures in the name of fighting terrorism. Despite 
their initial indignation at the revelations, the leaders of European governments have 
offered conflicting and ineffective responses. In the intelligence field as well as the 
EU’s broader relationship with the U.S., Europe does not seem prepared to challenge the 
status quo. This poses questions about the nature of future transatlantic cooperation. 
 
Europeans like to see themselves as equal 
partners in the transatlantic partnership. 
This is truer in some areas of the relation-
ship than in others. Trade negotiations take 
place on equal footing, since the economies 
of the EU and the U.S. are roughly equal in 
size, and decisions concerning the common 
market are the European Commission’s 
responsibility. In contrast, in military and 
defense matters, the U.S. plays in its own 
league. Nobody in Europe even aspires to 
match its role as a global military power. 
Traditional foreign policy is located some-
where between these two extremes. 
The importance of the surveillance affair 
lies in the fact that it touches on so many 
aspects of foreign policy. The bulk collec-
tion of EU citizens’ private data, in blatant 
disregard of EU regulations, not only vio-
lates the sovereignty of each member state 
and the EU as a whole, it also interferes 
with European systems of justice. The bug-
ging of EU institutions and policy makers 
violates international norms and rigs the 
game of traditional diplomacy. And the 
alleged economic espionage has the poten-
tial to skew economic competition in favor 
of the U.S. In all of these areas, the NSA’s 
activities reveal asymmetries between what 
each side is capable of and authorized to 
do. They also increase the power gap further 
in favor of the U.S. The excuse that “every-
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body spies” rings hollow. Just imagine the 
U.S. reaction if German intelligence had 
tried to tap the U.S. President’s phone. 
What is even more telling than the NSA’s 
activities themselves is the timid response 
from European governments, especially 
in contrast with the much more assertive 
reaction from the government of Brazil. 
Cooperation and conflict under 
conditions of asymmetry 
How then should Europe cope with the 
situation? The first step is to welcome 
the new insights as a badly needed reality 
check. It is time to seriously reassess roman-
ticized notions of “transatlantic friend-
ship.” Washington’s view of its European 
allies is, first and foremost, instrumental. 
Europe may be useful in some respects, but 
it is not seen as an equal partner. Europe 
still tends to see the transatlantic relation-
ship as unique, and perhaps rightly so. By 
the standard of Karl Deutsch’s classic con-
cept of the security community, whose 
defining feature is that war between its 
members is unthinkable, there is nothing 
to worry about. However, recent events 
somewhat challenge the idea of the trans-
atlantic security community as a Werte-
gmeinschaft, a community based on common 
values. This is especially true if we place the 
NSA affair in the context of how to fight 
terrorism. Surveillance is not the only issue 
where there is a gap between what the U.S., 
on the one hand, and most of Europe, on 
the other hand, consider to be legitimate 
means for fighting terrorism. The list also 
includes targeted killings, indefinite deten-
tions, and trials of terrorist suspects by 
military commissions. It was a deliberate 
choice by European governments to remain 
silent on these issues in the past years. 
After all, there are real dilemmas involved 
in fighting terrorism, and why poison the 
atmosphere when Europe itself did not 
always have good answers to the challenges 
terrorism poses? Yet, many controversial 
practices in the “War on Terror” that were 
once thought of as exceptional – if not il-
legal – are being institutionalized in U.S. 
law and practice. With the surveillance 
affair, Europeans are, for the first time, 
directly and broadly affected. Avoiding con-
flict over controversial issues out of a false 
sense of loyalty is not the right approach. 
If the EU wants to remain credible as 
a normative power, its representatives 
should speak up. This, however, requires 
a minimum of consensus among the mem-
ber states and a break with past practices 
ofaiding U.S. agencies in circumventing 
European data protection regulations. 
The fact that many intelligence services 
in Europe feel they have closer ties to the 
U.S. agencies than with those of other EU 
members, facilitates the U.S. strategy of 
divide et impera (divide and rule). The most 
promising initiatives for meaningful steps 
to counter U.S. surveillance practices are 
currently emerging from EU institutions 
such as the European Parliament and the 
Commission; however, the member states’ 
support is often lacking. 
Realistically assessing 
Obama’s record 
The U.S. government’s assertiveness in the 
intelligence field may seem paradoxical. 
After all, the political process in the United 
States is dysfunctional and characterized by 
gridlock, as demonstrated by last year’s gov-
ernment shutdown. Political polarization 
and a struggle within the Republican Party 
about its future direction make it difficult 
or impossible for the White House to im-
plement a number of reforms that are nec-
essary to keep the country competitive. 
On issues as diverse as paying its bills to 
reforming its entitlement programs, the 
U.S. government seems unable to imple-
ment a coherent policy. 
But at the same time, the national secu-
rity state has continued to expand. Con-
trary to the allegations of his critics in the 
U.S., President Barack Obama is not pre-
pared to give up Washington’s claim to glob-
al leadership. Among the continuities of 
U.S. foreign policy is the notion of “Ameri-
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can exceptionalism” – the belief that 
the United States is a force of good in the 
world, even if the means it chooses to 
accomplish its ends are problematic. 
Also not accurate is the prevalent view 
that President Obama has somehow fallen 
victim to an intelligence community that 
has gotten out of control. During his ten-
ure, funding for intelligence agencies and 
special forces within the military has in-
creased. At several points during his presi-
dency, Barack Obama was confronted with 
a clear choice of whether or not to curtail 
the NSA’s powers. Instead, he has expanded 
them. While the intelligence-industrial 
complex has certainly become a powerful 
political player, the President was certain-
ly aware of the developments and bears 
responsibility. His response to the recent 
report by the President’s Review Group 
on Intelligence and Communications 
Technologies (www.whitehouse.gov/sites/ 
default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_ 
report.pdf) will show whether or not his 
position has changed in the face of public 
scrutiny and international criticism. The 
group goes further than many expected 
with its recommendations for substantial 
reforms of the NSA’s practices. 
Areas of cooperation: The Middle 
East and North Africa 
Part of a European reassessment of trans-
atlantic relations should be a sober analysis 
of how Europe and the U.S. can cooperate 
under conditions of asymmetry. Common 
interests should not be assumed by default, 
but established through careful considera-
tion. There are good reasons to work togeth-
er on issues of common concern and when 
interests converge. One of the most pres-
sing common challenges is the turmoil in 
the greater Middle East and North Africa 
(MENA). With the West’s influence waning, 
the only chance to have any impact at all 
is for Western countries to cooperate close-
ly when engaging in the MENA region. The 
U.S. cannot turn its back on the region’s 
many crises any time soon, even if the 
Obama administration declared its inten-
tion to reduce U.S. engagement in the 
MENA region and to shift attention toward 
Asia. For Europe, the problem is in some 
respects even more urgent: The instability 
is located in its immediate neighborhood 
and has direct repercussions on Europe, for 
example through refugee flows into the 
EU. The U.S. and Europe share many funda-
mental and long-term goals in the MENA 
region: to end the civil war in Syria; to work 
toward a stable and democratic government 
in Egypt; to prevent Iran from building 
nuclear weapons; and to facilitate a nego-
tiated settlement of the conflict between 
Israel and the Palestinians within the 
framework of a two-state solution. Ameri-
cans are tired of military interventions, 
and – at least under the current adminis-
tration – Washington wants to avoid mili-
tary involvement in Syria and Iran as much 
as the Europeans do. 
Western influence on the events unfold-
ing in the Middle East is limited. Especially 
the internal dynamics of conflicts such as 
those in Egypt and Syria can hardly be con-
trolled from the outside. Despite these lim-
its, the impact of the West in the region can 
be maximized if Western countries coordi-
nate their actions. Under current circum-
stances, the White House is often closer to 
European positions on Middle East issues 
than Congress. So Europe can back the 
White House position to help it deal with 
domestic constraints. But in some situa-
tions, more independent European posi-
tions might do more to help the President 
accomplish important goals. Two examples: 
Domestic politics complicate the U.S. gov-
ernment’s ability to pressure Israel to par-
ticipate in good faith negotiations with the 
Palestinians on a two-state solution. Europe 
should continue to insist that such a nego-
tiated solution is in Israel’s own interest, 
and that a failure to compromise on settle-
ments will isolate Israel internationally in 
the long run. Reactions to the EU directive, 
which limits the ability of Israeli organiza-
tions active in the occupied territories to 
apply for grants, prizes, and financial in-
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struments funded by the EU (2013/C 205/ 
05), shows that such signals do not go un-
noticed. 
With respect to the negotiations on the 
Iranian nuclear program, there is a risk 
that the U.S. Congress will continue to call 
for more sanctions against Iran, thereby 
undermining the current window of oppor-
tunity for meaningful negotiations. Europe’s 
task here is to insist that a successful strat-
egy cannot rely on sticks alone but also 
needs carrots. The best chance to keep an 
overzealous Congress in check is to make 
it clear that Europe will not participate in 
any tightening of sanctions as long as the 
negotiations between the EU3 + 3 and 
Iran remain constructive. A closely coordi-
nated “good cop/bad cop” strategy between 
Europe and the U.S. – with the U.S. being 
the good cop vis-à-vis Israel in the negotia-
tions about the occupied territories and the 
bad cop in the nuclear negotiations with 
Iran, with Europe playing the respective op-
posite roles in close coordination – would 
maximize the West’s influence to reach 
common goals. It would also show that, 
although preferences may not be identical, 
cooperation can be in the mutual interest. 
TTIP: Only good for transatlantic 
relations if done right 
The surveillance affair has also led to a par-
tial reassessment of the negotiations of the 
Transatlantic Trade and Investment Part-
nership (TTIP). Only a year ago, TTIP was 
seen as the central issue on the trans-
atlantic agenda for the coming years and 
carried great expectations. Although calls 
by some in Europe to cancel negotiations in 
the wake of the NSA affair did not succeed, 
European enthusiasm about the free trade 
area has cooled somewhat. One reason is 
the concern that eavesdropping on com-
munication inside the EU will give the U.S. 
an unfair advantage in the negotiations. 
But more important is the realization that 
trade is not the solution to the most im-
portant transatlantic controversies. Many of 
the initial hopes associated with TTIP were 
unrealistic. Some claimed that the reduc-
tion of trade barriers would not only lead to 
more commerce and economic growth, but 
that the partnership could serve as a kind 
of economic NATO, strengthening ties in 
areas beyond trade. Such high expectations 
are problematic because they can facilitate 
a dynamic that seeks an agreement at all 
costs. Legitimate concerns, for example 
about the proposed investor-state dispute-
settlement mechanism (which would allow 
businesses to claim compensation from gov-
ernments in certain circumstances), may be 
ignored if the success of TTIP negotiations 
is charged with being the litmus test for 
the enduring relevance of the transatlantic 
partnership. 
Furthermore, if the trade talks are char-
acterized by the same pattern evident in 
the reaction to the surveillance affair, with 
the U.S. able to play EU member states off 
against each other, Europe has much to 
lose. For instance, if harmonizing privacy 
and data protection standards means giving 
way to lower U.S. standards, the interests of 
EU citizens would not be served well. Even 
though the EU’s standards of regulation 
are not necessarily always higher than U.S. 
requirements (environmental and consum-
er protection standards tend to be higher 
in the EU, whereas financial regulation is 
stricter in the U.S.), the principle of recog-
nizing each other’s standards will often 
mean, in practice, that the lower standards 
prevail. 
European negotiators should not rule 
out the possibility that no agreement can 
be reached. Only with the option of letting 
the talks fail will they have a strong nego-
tiating position. Members of the U.S. Con-
gress will not hesitate to vote against TTIP 
if its members conclude that the treaty 
is not in their constituents’ interests, and 
neither should the European Parliament. 
To support a bad agreement out of concern 
for transatlantic relations would certainly 
do more harm than good. 
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